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Do Suppliers Benefit from
Collaborative Relationships with
Large Retailers? An Empirical
Investigation of Efficient Consumer
Response Adoption
Collaborative manufacturer–retailer relationships based on efficient consumer response (ECR) have become ubiq-
uitous over the past decade. Yet academic studies of ECR adoption and its impact on marketing relationships are
relatively scarce. Inspired by the relational view of competitive advantage, the authors empirically investigate
whether the extent to which suppliers of a major retailer adopt ECR has a beneficial impact on their outcomes. The
results demonstrate that whereas ECR adoption has a positive impact on supplier economic performance and
capability development, it also generates greater perceptions of negative inequity on the part of the supplier. How-
ever, retailer capabilities and supplier trust moderate some of these main effects. The overall results are robust
with respect to differences in supplier size as well as between branded and private-label suppliers.
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Over the past two decades, marketing theory andpractice has embraced the idea of relationship mar-keting (e.g., Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Morgan
and Hunt 1994). In contrast to the traditional transaction-
based focus of market governance, the literature now
exhorts firms to develop collaborative partnerships and rela-
tional governance (e.g., Anderson and Weitz 1992; Ganesan
1994). Compared with the typical adversarial transactions
that involve bidding procedures in which multiple suppliers
compete against one another in an effort to drive down
prices, collaborative relationships adopt a long-term per-
spective and include an ongoing process to lower acquisi-
tion and operating costs (Cannon and Homburg 2001;
Kalwani and Narayandras 1995). Although collaborative
relationships through joint efforts of the partners create
unique value that neither partner can create independently,
there is tension between maximizing such value and distrib-
uting it between the partners (Zajac and Olsen 1993). This
makes collaborative relationships challenging to implement
in practice, particularly with powerful parties.
The challenge of developing collaborative marketing
relationships is perhaps most apparent in the fast-moving
consumer goods industry. Although there are differences of
opinion in the academic literature as to whether power has
shifted from manufacturers to retailers (Ailawadi 2001),
there is little doubt about the consolidation in the retail sec-
tor. For example, in the United States, the ten largest retail-
ers now account for 80% of the average manufacturer’s
business compared with approximately 30% a decade ago
(Boyle 2003). Besides the resultant price pressure from
large retailers, suppliers are finding it increasingly difficult
to develop their marketing strategy in isolation of the partic-
ular retailer’s strategy. This has encouraged suppliers to
develop closer relationships with major retailers in an
attempt to change the latter’s focus from purely price to
reducing the total cost in the marketing channel and
increasing value; this is a fundamental change in marketing
strategy (Kumar 1996). The major industry initiative to help
achieve this is called “efficient consumer response” (ECR).
ECR
The U.S. grocery retailers and branded manufacturers in the
fast-moving consumer goods industry launched the ECR
initiative in 1992. A study by Kurt Salmon Associates
(1993), a retail management consultancy firm, estimated
that streamlining the supply chain through the adoption of
ECR would lead to a total savings of 10.8% of retail price,
or $30 billion. It was anticipated that manufacturers would
receive 54% of these savings, and distributors and retailers
would receive the remaining 46% (ECR Europe 1997).
Over time, ECR has become a comprehensive initiative
comprising a dozen different ECR practices that are orga-
nized within three major areas of manufacturer–retailer col-
laboration: (1) demand side management, or collaborative
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practices to stimulate consumer demand by promoting joint
marketing and sales activities; (2) supply side management,
or collaborative practices to optimize supply, with a focus
on joint logistics and supply chain activities; and (3)
enablers and integrators, or collaborative information tech-
nology and process improvement tools to support joint rela-
tional activities. Although collaboration in each of these
areas could be pursued independently, in practice a compre-
hensive approach is promoted. Thus, we define ECR as a
cooperative value-creation strategy whereby retailers and
suppliers jointly implement collaborative business practices
with the ultimate objective of fulfilling consumer wishes
together, better, faster, and at less cost.
Despite the initial enthusiasm, a decade later, signs of
skepticism seem to be gathering steam. In particular, suppli-
ers believe that retailers have been the prime beneficiaries
of ECR. There is a widespread belief among suppliers that
ECR is just a convenient label for large and powerful retail-
ers to continue doing what they have always been perceived
as doing, namely, finding ways to pass costs back to the
suppliers. To investigate this issue rigorously, we empiri-
cally assess whether and under what conditions suppliers
benefit from collaborative ECR relationships with major
retailers.
A review of the literature indicates surprisingly few
empirical investigations of ECR adoption on performance.
Related empirical studies of manufacturer–retailer relation-
ships tend to fall into two categories. First, several investi-
gations assess the impact of tighter manufacturer–retailer
relationships on performance, as reflected in relational con-
structs such as interfirm coordination, trust, or mutual
dependence (e.g., Heide and John 1992; Lusch and Brown
1996). Although greater trust, mutual interdependence, or
interfirm coordination may be associated with ECR, these
constructs are conceptually distinct from ECR, which pro-
motes the joint implementation of collaborative processes
and routines. Furthermore, these studies have typically
examined supplier relationships with relatively small retail-
ers (e.g., automobile, tire dealers) rather than with the large
retailers that populate and often dominate suppliers in the
packaged goods industry.
Second, three studies (Dhar, Hoch, and Kumar 2001;
Gruen and Shah 2000; Stank, Crum, and Arango 1999) have
examined the effects of the adoption of specific aspects of
ECR, such as category management, on performance within
the grocery industry. However, these studies do not assess
the specific benefits for suppliers from ECR participation.
In the face of large retailers that have the potential ability to
dominate suppliers and thus appropriate any gains, whether
ECR provides any benefits to suppliers remains an open
question.
There are three objectives to this study. First, we pro-
pose a comprehensive scale to measure collaborative ECR
relationships between suppliers and retailers. Second, we
examine the effects of ECR adoption on supplier outcomes
and the conditions under which such relationships with
large retailers are likely to be beneficial to suppliers. Third,
we attempt to determine whether the effects of collaborative
ECR relationships are similar for large versus small manu-
facturers and branded versus private-label suppliers. Cur-
rently, we do not know what collaborative ECR relation-
ships are, who they benefit, and under which conditions.
Theory and Research Hypotheses
Recently, Dyer and Singh (1998) proposed a “relational
view of competitive advantage” based on the observation
that a firm’s critical resources may span firm boundaries.
Dyer and Singh argue that such a relational view differs
fundamentally from the two prominent perspectives that
currently explain the sources of competitive advantage—
industry structure (Porter 1980) and the resource-based
view of the firm (Barney 1991)—and they propose four key
sources of relational rents. According to Dyer and Singh,
relational rents flow when alliance partners (1) invest in
relation-specific assets, (2) develop interfirm knowledge-
sharing routines, (3) use effective governance mechanisms,
and (4) exploit complementary capabilities. Our conceptual
model of the antecedents and consequences of suppliers’
ECR adoption (see Figure 1) is inspired by this framework.
In developing the model, we selected constructs that were
both relevant to the practice of ECR and of theoretical inter-
est to the relationship marketing literature, while ensuring
coverage of all four sources of relational advantage.
Relation-specific assets help lower total value chain
costs, enhance product differentiation, reduce operational
problems, and accelerate product development cycles.
Transaction-specific investments (e.g., Anderson and Weitz
1992; Heide and John 1988), cross-functional teams, and
tailored incentive systems (e.g., Procter & Gamble’s cus-
tomer development team for Wal-Mart based in Ben-
tonville) are most frequently mentioned as critical
antecedents of supplier ECR adoption, and therefore we
included these in our framework.
Interfirm knowledge-sharing routines facilitate informa-
tion sharing and help alliance partners increase their
partner-specific absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal
1990; Lane and Lubatkin 1998). In its essence, ECR adop-
tion is about sharing information and designing interfirm
routines that facilitate interorganizational learning to
enhance customer value.
Effective governance influences the willingness of
alliance partners to engage in value-creation initiatives
(Zajac and Olsen 1993). Self-enforcing safeguards (e.g.,
trust, economic hostages) are preferable to third-party safe-
guards (e.g., legal contracts) because they lower transaction
costs and create incentives for value-creation initiatives
(Telser 1980).
Complementary capabilities are the justification for
interorganizational marketing relationships because they
help partners create value that they cannot generate inde-
pendently (Zajac and Olsen 1993). Thus, we included
retailer capabilities in our framework as a moderator
because ECR relationships with smarter retailers should
result in more beneficial outcomes for suppliers.
In summary, given our focus on investigating supplier
outcomes from ECR adoption, our model comprises four sets
of factors: (1) the antecedent supplier factors that foster or
discourage ECR adoption, (2) the focal ECR adoption con-
struct, (3) the outcomes for the supplier from ECR adoption,
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FIGURE 1
Model of ECR Adoption
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and (4) the moderating factors of trust and retailer capabili-
ties that either strengthen or weaken the relationships
between ECR adoption and performance. However, we note
that to some extent, the relationships in Figure 1 between the
antecedent constructs (i.e., transaction-specific assets, cross-
functional teams, and incentive systems) and ECR are recip-
rocal. The logic for ordering the antecedents of ECR was
based on three factors. First, we conceptualize ECR as a
process that gains over time, whereas incentive systems,
investments, and cross-functional teams have more of an “on/
off” character to them. Second, our framework follows the
structure–conduct–performance approach (Bain 1956) in
which, as a process for managing the relationship, ECR is
viewed as “conduct,” whereas the antecedent variables are
viewed more as “structure.” Third, interviews with managers
indicated that they believed that unless the three antecedents
were in place, any ECR initiative was bound to fail.
Antecedents of ECR Adoption
Transaction-specific investments are investments in a rela-
tionship that are of lower value when used in an alternative
relationship (Heide and John 1988). Close relationships
often emerge as a response to safeguard transaction-specific
investments (Williamson 1985). Historically, and before the
advent of ECR, suppliers of large and powerful retailers in
particular have been forced to commit to physical, process,
and human assets for dedicated production capacity, logis-
tics capabilities, and market research to adapt to a retailer’s
assortment and replenishment concepts (Bloom and Perry
2001; Johnson 1999). Suppliers that have made investments
in relation-specific structures with a retailer increase their
collaborative conduct in relation to that of their partner to
safeguard their previously unprotected dedicated assets
(Bain 1956).
Effective ECR adoption requires that suppliers imple-
ment supportive organizational systems, such as cross-
functional teams and ECR friendly incentive systems,
before ECR adoption. Because ECR requires tight coordi-
nation between supply side and demand side practices
between partners, manufacturers such as Unilever assign
multilevel, multifunctional, customer business development
teams to their major retail accounts. Such teams replace the
traditional supplier–retailer interfaces, which were charac-
terized by lower-level sales representatives who called on
buyers and emphasized prices, quantities, and deals. In
addition, companies such as Procter & Gamble have
adapted their incentive systems to support ECR adoption.
An interview partner mentioned that “if internal perfor-
mance measurement and reward systems do not capture true
costs and profits, then the ECR effort will not result in sig-
nificant and lasting progress.” Thus:
H1: The greater the transaction-specific investments by the
supplier, the higher is the level of ECR adoption. 
H2: The greater the implementation of (a) cross-functional
teams and (b) a supportive incentive system in the sup-
plier’s organization, the higher is the level of ECR
adoption.
Effects of ECR Adoption on Supplier Outcomes
Given our objective to assess whether suppliers benefit
from adopting ECR, we pursue a comprehensive assess-
ment of supplier performance from three different perspec-
tives: economic, relational, and strategic.
Economic performance. Growth, profits, and sales are
the most frequently used measures of economic perfor-
mance (Kumar, Stern, and Achrol 1992; Venkatraman and
Ramanujam 1986). To be close to the concept of relational
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rents, we define supplier economic performance as the
sales, profits, and growth that a supplier generates in the
product category with the focal retailer compared with its
performance at other retailers and other categories.
Suppliers that adopt ECR incur lower transaction costs
because, contrary to traditional adversarial relationships,
trading partners that adopt ECR do not need to specify
every detail of the agreement in a contract. Monitoring
costs are also lowered as self-enforcement replaces the
more expensive external or third-party monitoring. Suppli-
ers proactively engage in value-creation initiatives, such as
sharing valuable knowledge (e.g., consumer and shopper
knowledge) or combining complementary resources (e.g.,
to develop categories or new solutions for consumers), if
they are credibly assured that this knowledge will not be
readily shared with competitors (Dyer and Singh 1998).
Parties in ECR relationships are more likely to engage in
such value-creating activities because the joint processes
serve as economic hostages, and there are credible assur-
ances that they will be rewarded for their efforts.
Perceived equity. Relational performance can be exam-
ined through supplier perceptions of equity in the relation-
ship with the retailer. Equity is related to the division of
benefits and burdens. A supplier experiences equity when it
perceives that the outcomes it and the retailer receive are
proportional to their respective inputs to the relationship
(Scheer, Kumar, and Steenkamp 2003).
Jap (2001, p. 88) notes that “how the sharing process
affects the relationship also carries long-term ramifications.
In many industries, organizations need to work with each
other on a repeated basis. If organizations act opportunisti-
cally in the short run, they may develop a negative reputa-
tion that will inhibit other organizations from working with
them in the future.” Because ECR relationships are long-
term relationships with significant specific investments,
partners are more likely to monitor and address any tempo-
rary inequities over time to prevent dissolution resulting
from inequity.
Capability development. Finally, we conceptualized
supplier strategic performance using the dynamic capability
lens that emphasizes the importance of capability develop-
ment through organizational learning (Teece, Pisano, and
Shuen 1997). Empirical attempts to measure capability
improvements are scarce. Herein, we conceptualized a sup-
plier’s capability development as improvements in ECR-
related processes resulting from collaboration with the focal
retailer.
Interorganizational learning is critical to competitive
success because organizations often learn by collaborating
with other organizations (e.g., Inkpen 1996). It is through
collaborative experiences that both explicit and tacit knowl-
edge are shared and new knowledge is created (Inkpen
1996). Efficient consumer response helps create interfirm
knowledge-sharing routines that permit the transfer, recom-
bination, or creation of specialized knowledge. Further-
more, the ability to exploit outside sources of knowledge is
largely a function of prior related knowledge or the
“absorptive capacity” of the recipient (Cohen and Levinthal
1990). Efficient consumer response is likely to help the sup-
plier develop partner-specific absorptive capacity to assimi-
late valuable knowledge from a particular retailer (Lane and
Lubatkin 1998).
H3: The higher the level of ECR adoption, the greater is the
supplier’s (a) economic performance, (b) perceived equity,
and (c) capability development.
Main Effects of Trust on Supplier Outcomes
In adversarial relationships, suppliers devote significant
resources to detect, estimate, and counteract retailer oppor-
tunism (e.g., diverting, forward buying), thus increasing
transaction costs and lowering economic performance.
Trust results in greater openness between suppliers and
retailers and thus greater knowledge and appreciation for
each other’s contribution to the relationship. Consistent
with this reasoning, several studies find positive associa-
tions between trust and economic performance (e.g.,
Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 1998; Zaheer, McEvily,
and Perrone 1998) as well as between trust and distributive
justice (e.g., Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995).
Although it is widely acknowledged that openness and
transparency have a positive effect on learning (Doz 1996;
Hamel 1991; Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995), few studies dis-
cuss the effects of trust on capability development. From a
transaction-cost perspective, self-enforcing safeguards such
as trust contribute to a freer and greater exchange of infor-
mation between committed exchange partners because deci-
sion makers do not believe that it is necessary to protect
themselves from the other’s opportunistic behavior.
More important than the quantity of information
exchanged is the ability to absorb tacit and “sticky” know-
how. Unlike information, knowledge is about beliefs, com-
mitment, action, and meaning. Thus, it is often defined as
“justified true belief” (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). Infor-
mation and know-how are also context specific and rela-
tional (i.e., they depend on the situation and are created
dynamically in social interaction among people). Informa-
tion in adversarial relationships may be suspected of being
false, misleading, or manipulative and therefore may not be
internalized. Trust increases the perceived truthfulness of
knowledge, enhances the absorption of tacit and sticky
know-how from an exchange partner, and thus improves the
capability development of the supplier.
H4: The higher the level of trust, the greater is the supplier’s
(a) economic performance, (b) perceived equity, and (c)
capability development.
Moderating Effects of Trust on Supplier Outcomes
Although suppliers may be forced to adopt collaborative
ECR practices by dominant retailers, in the absence of trust,
it is unlikely that suppliers will proactively initiate many of
the value-creating initiatives that would benefit both parties.
There is always the fear in nonexclusive relationships that
the other party may share the acquired knowledge with oth-
ers. In the presence of trust, ECR adoption leads to an even
freer and greater exchange of information and know-how
between retailers and suppliers because of the reduced fear
of opportunistic behavior. Specifically, ECR provides the
ability to work with the partner using more effective and
efficient routines, but trust motivates parties to exploit its
potential benefits fully. Furthermore, in addition to obtain-
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ing greater benefits, companies that have ECR relationships
with high levels of trust are likely to invest more in the rela-
tionship. The ensuing positive spiral of investments and
benefits for each party should make it more difficult to keep
track of strict proportionality, thus leading to greater feel-
ings of equity.
H5: The higher the level of trust, the greater are the effects of
ECR adoption on the supplier’s (a) economic perfor-
mance, (b) perceived equity, and (c) capability
development.
Main Effects of Retailer Capabilities on Supplier
Outcomes
Although congruent competencies help a company under-
stand the limitations, processes, and nature of the other
party’s competencies, they impede the ability to create
returns beyond that which is individually obtainable to each
firm. In contrast, complementary retailer resources supply
critical capabilities and generate greater performance bene-
fits for the supplier. For example, in an ECR relationship,
suppliers may contribute to category management with a
distinct know-how of managing products and understanding
consumers, whereas retailers may supply their knowledge
about categories and the shoppers. For efficient replenish-
ment processes, manufacturers possess unique know-how
about competitive downstream promotions, and retailers
possess unique knowledge about proprietary downstream
sales patterns. The synergistic potential of such comple-
mentary assets may vary and create differential potentials
for interpartner learning and thus for increasing relational
rents (Dyer and Singh 1998). In addition, the greater the
retailer capability, the more valued are the inputs of the
retailer, thus leading to more favorable perceptions of
equity.
H6: The higher the level of retailer capabilities, the greater is
the supplier’s (a) economic performance, (b) perceived
equity, and (c) capability development.
Moderating Effects of Retailer Capabilities on
Supplier Outcomes
Although in principle the retailer’s capabilities are equally
available for all of its suppliers, not all suppliers are equally
capable of exploiting them (Lane and Lubatkin 1998).
Recent research indicates that the ability of alliance partners
to realize the benefits from a partner’s strategic resources is
conditioned on compatibility in decision processes, infor-
mation and control systems, and culture (Doz 1996). By
default, ECR adoption leads to greater compatibility of
organizational systems because the creation of joint pro-
cesses and the sharing of data and know-how increases
interoperability of processes and systems, which in turn
reduces transaction cost and increases economic and opera-
tional performance.
Firms vary in their ability to identify potential partners
and to value their resources as a result of differences in both
prior collaborative experiences and internal search and eval-
uation capabilities (Dyer and Singh 1998). We argue that
suppliers that engage in close and transparent ECR relation-
ships have a superior judgment of the retailer’s capabilities,
which favorably influences their perceptions of equity.
The effect of ECR adoption on capability development
is enhanced in the presence of superior retailer capabilities
because such capabilities create additional synergistic
resources that can be leveraged more effectively by the sup-
plier in intense collaborations. In ECR relationships,
partner-specific absorptive capacities enable better sharing,
absorption, and transformation of sticky and tacit knowl-
edge. Superior retailer capabilities reflect a larger reservoir
of knowledge that is available for absorption by the
supplier.
H7: The higher the level of retailer capabilities, the greater is
the effect of ECR adoption on the supplier’s (a) economic
performance, (b) perceived equity, and (c) capability
development.
Methodology
Research Setting and Data Collection Procedure
A supermarket chain that is among the world’s top 40 retail-
ers was the empirical setting. The retailer had asked all sup-
pliers to adopt ECR, but the response was mixed. Thus, it
volunteered to support our study. Selecting the suppliers of
a single retailer allowed the degree of control necessary to
enable us to tie any performance benefits for suppliers to
the effects of the constructs of interest (e.g., ECR adoption)
rather than to extraneous factors (e.g., differences between
retailer strategies or competitive environment) (cf. Hibbard,
Kumar, and Stern 2001). We collected data from two
sources: (1) survey data from suppliers of the retailer on the
extent of ECR adoption, perceived outcomes, antecedents,
and moderating constructs and (2) archival data from the
retailer’s records on supplier economic performance.
For the survey data collection, the retailer provided e-
mail addresses of active suppliers and the name of the main
supplier contact (typically the key account manager) for the
relationship. In total, 996 questionnaires, which promised
confidentiality of responses, were sent by e-mail. We asked
suppliers to select one of the three largest categories that
they supplied to the focal retailer and to answer all ques-
tions with respect to this category. A total of 216 e-mails
failed because of invalid e-mail addresses, four suppliers
were listed twice, and four suppliers had merged with other
suppliers on the list; this resulted in 772 questionnaires that
effectively reached their destination. Nonrespondents were
sent reminders by e-mail and were later telephoned. We
received 266 completed questionnaires, for an effective
response rate of 34.5%.
We evaluated nonresponse bias using Armstrong and
Overton’s (1977) procedure. Using two-tailed t-tests, we
compared early with late respondents on four important
demographic variables—supplier size, category share of
supplier’s sales, retailer’s share of supplier category sales,
and supplier’s share of category in the overall grocery
industry—and seven outcome measures—perceived eco-
nomic performance, archival sales value, archival sales vol-
ume, archival supplier service, archival invoice accuracy,
perceived equity, and capability development. Because we
observed no significant differences (p < .05), nonresponse
bias did not appear to be a problem, though a more stringent
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test would have been to compare respondents with nonre-
spondents (Mentzer, Flint, and Hult 2001).
Measure Validation for ECR Adoption 
Adapting Anderson and Gerbing’s (1988) two-step
approach, we developed separate measurement models
before conducting tests of the hypothesized relationships
between constructs. There is no ECR adoption scale in the
academic literature. Exploratory field research indicated
that the Global ECR Scorecard, developed by a team of
practitioners, consultants, and academics, provides a com-
prehensive framework for structuring ECR activities
between retailers and suppliers. The Global ECR Scorecard,
which is conceptualized as an index, is widely used and is
linked to a Web site on which online comparisons with
“best practices” are possible (www.globalscorecard.net).
The Global ECR Scorecard comprises 37 questions, each
related to a specific ECR practice, spanning the three ECR
dimensions: (1) demand side, which covers demand strategy
and capabilities, consumer value creation, and optimizing
assortments, promotions, and new product introductions;
(2) supply side, which covers supply strategy and capabili-
ties, responsive replenishment, integrated demand-driven
supply, and operational excellence; and (3) enablers and
integrators, which covers common data and communication
standards, cost/profit and value measurement, collaborative
planning, forecasting and replenishment, and e-business.
The Global ECR Scorecard has not been submitted to
any psychometric validation, and it has not been used in
academic studies. Many of the items are complex and diffi-
cult to understand. In addition, the practice of ECR has
evolved since 1998 when several national ECR scorecards
were consolidated into the Global ECR Scorecard question-
naire. To ensure that we covered the entire scope of ECR as
currently practiced, we reformulated the original items into
simpler questions. Then, using managers of the retailer’s
supplier relations department and several suppliers, we
reworded the questions so that their intended meaning
would be accessible without additional explanation. This
entailed splitting items into distinct questions, adding ques-
tions to convey the nuances of the concepts, or dropping
redundant items and those practices not currently used
under the scope of ECR. Consistent with the Global ECR
Scorecard, we used a five-point scale, anchored by “nothing
planned” and “fully implemented.” As a stem we formu-
lated, “For the product range you have chosen, to what
extent have the retailer and your company jointly imple-
mented a process to,” followed by the specific item.
Because ECR is conceptualized as a formative con-
struct, it is assumed that the items cause the latent variable
rather than the construct being reflected in its items (Jarvis,
Mackenzie, and Podsakoff 2003). Because formative con-
structs require a census of all concepts that form the con-
struct, we presented the resulting items to panels of retailers
and suppliers with extensive ECR experience to ensure that
they covered the entire domain of the concept (Jarvis,
Mackenzie, and Podsakoff 2003). We modified problematic
items for greater clarity. We then submitted all items to a
panel of three academics to assess face validity. On the
basis of this, 33 items constituted the ECR index; they
reflect three facets: (1) the demand side items, which
encompass four factors (each with three items) that we
labeled collaborative category development, collaborative
new product introduction, collaborative consumer value
creation, and collaborative channels development; (2) the
supply side items, which encompass two factors that we
labeled collaborative planning, forecasting, and replenish-
ment (which consists of five items) and collaborative trans-
port optimization (which consists of two items); and (3) the
enablers and integrators, which encompass three factors that
we labeled common data standards, collaborative opera-
tional problem solving, and collaborative process improve-
ment tools.
Because ECR is an index, we did not estimate a confir-
matory measurement model (Jarvis, Mackenzie, and Pod-
sakoff 2003). To form the index, we averaged the items to
obtain a score for each subfactor. Then, we averaged these
subfactor scores to obtain the scores for each of the three
facets, which we combined to obtain the ECR score for
each relationship. The Appendix contains the items, means,
and standard deviations.
Measure Validation for Other Constructs
We conceptualized transaction-specific investments in line
with Williamson’s (1985) distinction among physical,
process, human, and site-specific assets. However, because
our interviews indicated that site-specific investments were
a minor issue, we concentrated on the first three categories
of specific investments. We tailored items that Anderson
and Weitz (1992) and Heide and John (1988) use to the spe-
cific situation in the fast-moving consumer goods industry
on the basis of supplier interviews. We estimated a mea-
surement model that specified transaction-specific invest-
ments as a second-order factor and physical, process, and
human assets as first-order factors. As Table 1 indicates,
although the chi-square (125.593; degrees of freedom
[d.f.] = 52) was significant (p < .001), the comparative fit
index (CFI) (.960) and the Tucker–Lewis index (TLI) (.950)
were above the benchmark of .90. For the three first-order
factors, both composite reliabilities were between .84 and
.89, and the overall reliability for the second-order factor
was estimated at .78.
We developed new scales for cross-functional teams and
incentive systems. On the basis of supplier interviews, it
appeared that the three key supplier areas to help implement
ECR across retailers were category management, key
account management, and supply chain management. There-
fore, three items assessed whether cross-functional teams
and supportive incentive systems were implemented in rela-
tion to category management, key account management, and
supply chain management across retailers. We estimated a
measurement model that specified cross-functional teams
and incentive systems as two first-order factors. The chi-
square (53.031; d.f. = 8) was significant (p < .001), but the
overall fit was acceptable because the CFI (.956) and the
TLI (.918) were above the recommended level of .90. The
composite reliabilities were acceptable at .87 for cross-
functional teams and at .91 for incentive systems.
We measured the two moderators of trust and retailer
capabilities using five and seven items, respectively. We
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TABLE 1
Measurement Models for Antecedents, Moderators, and Outcomes of ECR Adoption
Antecedents Items Composite Reliabilities Fit Measures
Measurement Model 1
Transaction-Specific Investments
Physical assets 3 .84 χ2(52) = 125.593
Process assets 5 .89 CFI = .960
Human assets 4 .88 TLI = .950
12 .78 RMSEA = .073
Measurement Model 2
Organizational Enablers
Cross-functional teams 3 .87 χ2(8) = 53.031
Incentive systems 3 .91 CFI = .956
TLI = .918
RMSEA = .146
Measurement Model 3
Moderators
Trust 5 .83 χ2(53) = 214.238
Retailer capabilities 7 .92 CFI = .912
TLI = .891
RMSEA = .107
Measurement Model 4
Supplier Outcomes
Perceived economic performance 6 .81 χ2(64) = 421.510
Capability development 7 .93 CFI = .833
TLI = .796
RMSEA = .145
Notes: RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation.
used Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp’s (1995) five items of
trust, which assess the extent to which the retailer is honest
and benevolent. There was no existing scale to measure
retailer capabilities. On the basis of supplier interviews, we
identified seven key retailer capabilities with respect to
ECR, and the scale assessed the relative capabilities of the
focal retailer compared with other retailers. We estimated a
measurement model that specified the 12 items loading on
to the two constructs of trust and retailer capabilities.
Although the chi-square (214.238; d.f. = 53) was significant
(p < .001), the overall fit was reasonable because the CFI
(.912) and the TLI (.891) were close to or above the recom-
mended level of .90. The composite reliabilities were .83
and .92 for trust and retailer capabilities, respectively.
We assessed economic performance in three ways. We
measured (1) the supplier’s perception of its economic per-
formance, which encompasses turnover, profitability, and
growth, compared with other product categories and other
retailers. From the retailer’s archival records, for 206 of the
266 suppliers and for a period of 63 weeks (roughly 30
weeks before and 33 weeks after the initial mailing of the
questionnaire), we obtained data on each supplier’s (2)
weekly sales performance (i.e., sales value, or retail sales
value to the retailer per week) and sales volume (i.e., the
number of cases sold per week) and (3) weekly service per-
formance (i.e., supplier service, or percentage of cases sup-
plied against what the retailer ordered) and invoice accuracy
(i.e., the percentage of supplier invoices that match the
goods received in depot). Because data for each measure
were highly correlated, for each supplier, we averaged the
archival performance data across the 63 weeks and then
reduced the results to single standardized scores, one for
archival sales performance and one for archival service per-
formance. After a logarithmic transformation of each mea-
sure, we performed a principal components analysis for
each pair of two measures to extract two single-factor
scores for the subsequent analyses.
We used Scheer, Kumar, and Steenkamp’s (2003) adap-
tation of Walster, Walster and Berscheid’s (1978) global
equity measure in which equity is calculated as the quotient
of the perceived outputs and inputs of the supplier less the
quotient of the perceived outputs and inputs of the retailer.
Equity values less than zero indicate that the supplier per-
ceives negative inequity, whereas an equity index greater
than zero indicates that the supplier perceives positive
inequity. Because this is an index, we did not estimate a
confirmatory measurement model for equity.
Kale, Singh, and Perlmutter’s (2000) work inspired our
notion of capability development, which assessed whether
the supplier had significantly improved seven ECR-related
capabilities through working with the retailer. The measure-
ment model for perceived economic performance and capa-
bility development showed a significant chi-square (421.51;
d.f. = 64, p < .001), but the overall fit was marginal because
the CFI (.833) and the TLI (.796) were close to or above the
marginal threshold of .80. The composite reliabilities were
.81 for economic performance and .93 for supplier capability
development, and both exceeded the preferred level of .70.
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For all the confirmatory measurement models, we
assessed discriminant validity between pairs of constructs
using Anderson and Gerbing’s (1988) procedure as well as
Fornell and Larcker’s (1981) more stringent procedure,
which requires that the average variance extracted for any
two constructs is greater than their shared variance. All con-
structs demonstrated discriminant validity. For example, the
shared variance between cross-functional teams and incen-
tive systems was .245, whereas the average variance
extracted for the two constructs was .553 and .625, respec-
tively. In addition, we compared the average within-
construct item correlation with the average between-
constructs item correlation for the eight multi-item
constructs. Of the 21 such comparisons, all demonstrated
lower between-construct correlations. The previously dis-
cussed measure validation procedures demonstrate that all
the measures possess adequate unidimensionality, reliabil-
ity, and convergent and discriminant validity.
Results
To test our main and moderating effects hypotheses, we
used generalized least squares (GLS) analysis, which is pre-
ferred to ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions when the
residuals of the regression equations are correlated and the
system is recursive, because it fully accounts for correlation
of the diagonal sigma matrix and leads to estimates that are
unbiased and consistent (Greene 2003). In the face of a tri-
angular beta matrix of endogenous variables, seemingly
unrelated regression is equivalent to GLS (Lahiri and
Schmidt 1978); thus, we estimated our equations using
seemingly unrelated regression in SAS; however, for our
archival-based dependent variables, we used OLS because
their residuals were not correlated with ECR adoption as a
result of different measurement approaches. For all scales,
with the exception of the ECR adoption index, we used fac-
tor scores to combine the items into a construct score (Las-
tovicka and Thamodaran 1991). The construct level correla-
tion matrix appears in Table 2.
Table 3 provides an overview of the results. Consistent
with H1 and H2, transaction-specific investments (.416, p <
.001), cross-functional teams (.128, p < .001), and incentive
systems (.075, p < .05) have a positive impact on ECR
adoption. Consistent with H3a and H3c, ECR adoption has a
positive effect on the supplier’s perceptual economic perfor-
mance (.343, p < .001), archival sales (.391, p < .001), and
capability development (.845, p < .001). However, contrary
to H3b, ECR adoption has a significant, negative effect on
perceived equity (–.305, p < .001). We did not observe a
significant effect on archival service.
Consistent with H4, trust has a positive effect on the
supplier’s archival sales performance (.462, p < .05) and
perceived equity (.689, p < .001) but not on perceptual eco-
nomic performance, archival service performance, or capa-
bility development. Consistent with H5a, trust enhances the
relationship between ECR adoption and perceived eco-
nomic performance (.221, p < .05), but it has no significant
moderating effects on the two archival measures and capa-
bility development. Thus, H5a is partially supported, but H5c
is not. Contrary to H5b, trust negatively influences the rela-
tionship between ECR adoption and perceived equity
(–.158, p < .05).
Retailer capabilities have a positive effect on supplier
perceptual economic performance (.711, p < .01), archival
service performance (.586, p < .05), and capability develop-
ment (.455, p < .01). Thus, H6c is fully supported, but H6a is
only partially supported because the effects on archival
sales performance are not significant. Contrary to what we
expected, the effects of retailer capabilities on perceived
equity (H6b) are negative (–.446, p < .05).
The moderating effects of retailer capabilities are com-
plex. Contrary to H7a, retailer capabilities have a significant,
negative moderating effect on the relationship between
ECR adoption and supplier perceptual economic
performance (–.229, p < .05). The effects on archival sales
and service performance are not significant. However, con-
sistent with H7b, retailer capabilities have a positive moder-
ating effect on the relationship between ECR adoption and
perceived equity (.283, p < .001). We did not observe mod-
erating effects of retailer capabilities on capability develop-
ment; thus, H7c is not supported.
Effects of Supplier Size and Brand Type
Practitioners often have diverse opinions on what type of
suppliers—large versus small and private label versus
branded—benefit more from ECR. Lacking any theoretical
reasons for such differences, we decided not to develop
hypotheses but rather to explore this issue post hoc. We
conducted two sets of analyses. First, to assess the robust-
ness of the results with respect to supplier size, we divided
the overall sample into large versus small suppliers. Second,
to assess the robustness of the results with respect to
branded versus private-label suppliers, we divided the sam-
ple into those primarily supplying supplier brands and those
primarily supplying private-label products. We initially con-
ducted paired differences tests to examine whether the split
samples differed significantly on the key antecedents and
outcome constructs. Because we did not observe significant
differences in the case of either split, we concluded that the
subsamples were representative of the overall sample. We
then tested the effects of supplier size and brand type by
including corresponding dummy variables into each of the
five regression equations that we estimated previously. All
ten coefficients related to the dummies were insignificant,
indicating that neither supplier size nor supplier brand type
had any significant effects (p < .10) on our results. There-
fore, our findings are robust with respect to differences
between supplier size and brand type.
In addition, we explored whether certain types of sup-
pliers were more likely to adopt ECR. Regression results
with ECR adoption as the dependent variable indicate that
the supplier’s total company sales (.166, p < .05), the prod-
uct range’s share of the supplier’s total sales (.213, p < .01),
and the retailer’s share of the supplier’s total sales in this
product group (.224, p < .01) had significant, positive
effects on ECR adoption. In contrast, the proportion of the
supplier’s turnover with the retailer in the product range that
is private label (.061, p > .10) and the share of this product
range in the total grocery market (.031, p > .10) did not
have significant effects. In summary, the larger the supplier
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1Note that size of the supplier is a different construct from the
archival sales measure that we use as one of our dependent vari-
ables. Size of the supplier reflects sales to all retailers across all
categories, whereas our archival sales measure reflects sales to this
retailer in the focal category. The correlation between the two indi-
cators is .133.
is and the more important the category and the retailer are
to the supplier, the more likely it is that the supplier adopts
ECR.1 Conversely, the proportion of branded versus
private-label supplies or the size of the category does not
seem to make a difference.
General Discussion
Although “win-win” partnerships, such as that between
Wal-Mart and Procter & Gamble, are frequently docu-
mented in the popular press, academic studies of collabora-
tive ECR relationships are scarce, probably because of the
sensitivity of the parties involved in providing the necessary
data. Compared with small dealers that frequently consti-
tute the sample of relationship marketing research, it is
more difficult to persuade large retailers to cooperate with
academic studies. We created the conditions for supplier
cooperation with this study by obtaining a retailer’s cooper-
ation and by promising an independent, confidential investi-
gation. This is unique because, in general, suppliers are
unwilling to disclose particulars of their relationships with
dominant retailers. In addition, archival performance data
from the focal retailer complemented the performance per-
ceptions of the suppliers, thus providing a comprehensive
view of the effects of ECR adoption.
To the question, “Do collaborative relationships with
large retailers benefit suppliers?” the answer is a qualified
yes, because suppliers perceived significant economic and
learning payoffs. However, contrary to our expectation,
ECR adoption led to greater feelings of inequity in the rela-
tionship on the part of suppliers. Perhaps this explains why
many suppliers complain that they do not observe any ben-
efits from the adoption of ECR (Corsten and Kumar 2003).
Although suppliers gain from ECR adoption in absolute
terms, as demonstrated by the positive effects on perceived
economic performance, archival sales, and capability devel-
opment, their perception of the inequitable sharing of the
benefits and burdens of ECR adoption leads them to believe
that they are relatively deprived. In other words, although
suppliers gain more in ECR relationships than in other rela-
tionships, they still believe that they receive less than they
deserve. In addition, the negative interaction between ECR
adoption and trust on equity indicates that as suppliers’ trust
in the retailer increases, greater ECR adoption makes sup-
pliers believe that they are even more inequitably treated.
The negative impact of ECR adoption on equity, even in
the presence of high trust, raises the question whether the
suppliers’ feelings of greater inequity in ECR relationships
are accurate and justified or merely a perceptual problem.
Perhaps, and anecdotal evidence suggests this, smart retail-
ers use their power advantage to extract proportionately
greater benefits from ECR adoption while cajoling suppli-
ers into making the necessary investments for ECR. Indeed,
our findings suggest that suppliers believe that they are par-
ticularly exploited by retailers that they consider to possess
superior know-how in the market. That large and powerful
retailers such as Metro, Tesco, and Wal-Mart are demanding
that their suppliers adopt ECR may be considered further
evidence in support of this point of view. Given retailer
power, suppliers have little choice but to comply with
retailer demands and learn to live with inequitable returns
from ECR adoption.
The alternative view is that suppliers’ perceptions of
greater inequity in ECR relationships are inaccurate and
that suppliers receive equitable benefits from ECR.
Ailawadi’s (2001) findings that, despite 20 years of increas-
ing retail power, supplier rents have actually risen compared
with retailer rents may be cited as evidence in support of
this view. However, it is possible that suppliers are simply
“paranoid” when they claim that retailers always receive the
lion’s share (Farris and Ailawadi 1992).
Unfortunately, we cannot make definitive judgments
about the accuracy of suppliers’ perceptions of inequity
associated with ECR adoption or the process underlying
any misperceptions with our data. We must leave the ulti-
mate resolution to further research. Furthermore, from an
economic welfare perspective, it would be interesting to
understand whether ECR benefits are indeed competed
away at the retail level, resulting in tangible benefits for the
consumer, such as lower prices, more choice, and more ser-
vice, or whether it simply leads to greater economic perfor-
mance for suppliers and retailers.
That trust increases archival sales and that retailer capa-
bilities enhance perceived economic and archival service
performance partially support our reasoning. It pays to
develop trust in relationships and to work with smarter
retailers. In addition, ECR relationships with trusted retail-
ers enhance some of the economic benefits for the supplier.
The moderating effects of retailer capabilities are more
complex. Unexpectedly, retailer capabilities have a negative
interaction with ECR adoption on supplier economic per-
formance. This finding seems somewhat at odds with the
observed and expected positive interaction between retailer
capabilities and ECR adoption on perceived equity. It
implies that smart retailers take a bite out of the supplier’s
economic performance, yet suppliers are happier with what
is left.
We speculate that gradually, suppliers become depen-
dent on the capabilities of smarter retailers. After all, ECR
is a knowledge- and data-intensive process, and as suppliers
become increasingly locked in on consumer data and
knowledge of smarter retailers, such retailers may be able to
extract some of the additional rents generated through ECR
adoption and appropriate them for themselves. Still, why do
suppliers perceive greater equity in ECR relationships with
smarter retailers, especially in light of the lowered supplier
economic benefits that they receive from ECR adoption
with these capable retailers?
Bargaining and negotiation theory predicts that asym-
metric capabilities lead to a perception of relative inferior-
ity, which in turn leads to the passive acceptance of lower
performance outcomes. Dwyer and Walker (1981) examine
bargaining between pairs of negotiators when there are
power imbalances. They show that weaker parties appear to
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expect and to receive a smaller share of the benefits to
divide between them, whereas the stronger parties enjoy the
reverse situation. In addition, suppliers may be more willing
to make concessions to powerful and smarter retailers in the
hope that such relationships may help expand market share.
Bloom and Perry (2001) find that suppliers of Wal-Mart,
certainly a powerful and smart retailer, with a large market
share perform better than do large-share suppliers that
report retailers other than Wal-Mart as their primary cus-
tomers. Finally, suppliers learn from smart retailers, which
may explain why they believe that it is fair that such retail-
ers take a bigger bite out of the ECR returns. However,
these are conjectures that require more rigorous research to
resolve.
Limitations
We must note some limitations of this study. First, we con-
ducted our research in a particular setting—that is, with the
suppliers of a single retailer—which raises questions of
generalizability with respect to both other retailers and
other countries. Second, although we obtained archival data
on the performance of the suppliers, it would have been
useful to examine the retailer’s perceptions of ECR adop-
tion and the outcomes from ECR. Adding category or brand
development indexes as performance measures to better
understand the competitive effects of ECR adoption would
also be valuable. The archival service performance measure
would benefit from further investigation to better under-
stand what other variables explain the remaining variance.
Third, a more stringent test of respondents versus nonre-
spondents should have been conducted. Fourth, for the first
time in the literature, we propose a scale to assess ECR
adoption. This scale requires subsequent replication and
refinement. Finally, the role of antecedents, focal construct,
and moderating variables (trust and retailer capabilities) and
their impact on outcomes would benefit from more strin-
gent longitudinal studies.
Conclusions
Notwithstanding the new relationship paradigm, there is
considerable cynicism among suppliers about deeper col-
laborative relationships with large and powerful retailers.
This has led some observers to note that in practice, “the
days of power play between retailers and manufacturers are
far from over” (Kuipers 2001, p. 25). Despite this, our study
demonstrates that suppliers achieve greater economic per-
formance and develop their capabilities in collaborative
ECR relationships. These findings apply regardless of
whether a supplier is small or large or whether it supplies
private-label or branded goods. However, considering the
high cost of ECR adoption, suppliers should be prudent and
safeguard their investments. If a supplier has a choice, our
study provides some guidelines as to which type of retailers
it should favor in establishing ECR relationships. As a sup-
plier, it is preferable to partner with trusted and smart
retailers.
Our findings on perceived equity indicate that suppliers
should be realistic about the sharing of benefits from ECR
adoption if they want to avoid negative feelings associated
with inequity. Negative inequity can lead to frustration and
hostility, and eventually, this can threaten a relationship. It
may be wise for suppliers to “manage” equity by adapting
their perceptions of contributions and benefits and by
accepting some inequity as the “cost of doing business,”
particularly when, as we demonstrate herein, there are sub-
stantial economic and learning benefits from ECR
relationships.
Demand Side Collaboration (1.98, .04)g
Collaborative Category Developmenta (1.98, .06)g
For the product range that you have chosen, to what
extent have the retailer and your company jointly
implemented a process to
•share and discuss consumer and shopper wants
and needs;
•share and discuss shopping, buying, and
consumption patterns (e.g., loyalty cards); and
•evaluate promotions jointly against a common set of
objectives?
Collaborative New Product Introductiona (2.27, .06)g
For the product range that you have chosen, to what
extent have the retailer and your company jointly
implemented a process to
•discuss new product ideas and prototypes;
•jointly test prototypes (trial launches), formulas, and
recipes; and
•evaluate new product introductions jointly against a
common set of objectives?
Collaborative Consumer Value Creationa (2.38, .06)g
To what extent have the retailer and your company
jointly implemented a process to
•display products in combination with complementary
products or services;
•implement innovative point-of-sales displays,
shelves, or services; and
•derived all plans and strategies from the principles
of creating value for the consumer?
Collaborative Channel Developmenta (1.35, .04)g
To what extent have the retailer and your company
jointly implemented a process to
•sell products over the internet;
•deliver products directly to customers’ homes; and
•establish other alternative, nontraditional channels
to consumers?
APPENDIX
ECR Adoption Measures
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Supply Side Collaboration (2.55, .06)g
Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, 
and Replenishmenta (2.38, .06)g
For the product range that you have chosen, to what
extent have the retailer and your company jointly
implemented a process to
•share and discuss planning information,
•share and discuss forecasting information,
•plan production and replenishment along the whole
supply chain,
•plan and schedule production processes based on
the retailer’s sales data, and
•optimize product flow while balancing service level
and costs along the whole supply chain?
Collaborative Transport Optimizationa (2.74, .08)g
For the product range that you have chosen, to what
extent have the retailer and your company jointly
implemented a process to
•optimize transport utilization without compromising
the required service level and
•integrate hauliers, logistics, and/or information
service providers into operational processes?
Enablers and Integrators (2.28, .05)g
Common Data Standardsa (2.68, .08)g
To what extent do the retailer and your company use
international standards
•to track and trace products, shipping containers,
pallets, and/or locations (e.g., European article
numbering);
•to exchange master data (e.g., European article
numbering);
•to share information by the Internet (e.g., global
messaging protocols);
•for electronic data interchange (e.g., EDIFACT); and
•for barcode scanning?
Collaborative Operational Problem Solvinga (2.34, .07)g
To what extent have the retailer and your company
jointly implemented a process to solve problems
concerning
•product availability at point of sales;
•delivery accuracy;
•production effectiveness; and
•upstream supply of ingredients, raw material, and
packaging?
Collaborative Process Improvement Toolsa (1.81, .05)g
For the product range that you have chosen, to what
extent have the retailer and your company jointly
implemented a process to
•regularly map and analyze joint processes and
•continuously improve processes into more
integrated joint processes?
To what extent do the retailer and your company use
•profit/cost modeling (e.g., activity based costing) to
analyze the supply chain cost and identify joint
savings;
•scorecards and templates to analyze, assess, and
monitor each other’s relational capabilities; and
•checklists, templates, or guidelines to assist
decision making?
Transaction-Specific Investments
Physical Assetsb
Our company has made significant investments
dedicated to the retailer that cannot be deployed
elsewhere in
•production systems (e.g., dedicated lines),
•logistics and distribution systems, and
•information systems.
Process Assetsb
To meet the requirements of dealing with the retailer,
our company has specifically tailored the
•category management process,
•product development process,
•promotion process,
•replenishment process, and
•product launch process.
Human Assetsb
Substantial time and effort is spent meeting face-to-
face with the retailer’s representatives by our
•customer business or key account managers,
•supply chain managers, and
•product development managers.
Cross-Functional Teamsc
To what extent has your company implemented cross-
functional teams for
•category management,
•key account management, and
•supply chain management?
Incentive Systemsc
To what extent has your company implemented
incentive systems and remuneration policies to support
•category management,
•key account management, and
•supply chain management?
Trustb
•The retailer usually keeps the promises it makes to
our company.
•The retailer gives sound advice on our business,
and our company knows it is sharing its best
judgment.
•The retailer is concerned about our company’s
welfare, particularly when making major decisions.
•The retailer responds with understanding when we
inform it of problems.
•Our company can depend on the retailer’s support
in matters of importance to us.
Retailer Capabilitiesd
Compared with other retailers that you work with, to
what extent has the retailer superior know-how with
respect to
•category management,
•supply chain management,
•consumer/customer understanding,
•pricing management,
•promotion management,
•new product launch, and
•new product development?
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Perceived Economic Performancee
For this product range, and compared with others, how
high is your
•profitability,
•turnover, and
•growth?
At the retailer, and compared with other retailers that
you work with, for the chosen product range, how high
is your
•profitability,
•growth, and
•turnover?
Perceived Equityf
All things considered, evaluate your company’s and the
retailer’s relative participation in this relationship
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•your company’s contributions to the relationship,
•the retailer’s contributions to the relationship,
•the outcomes your company receives from the
relationship, and
•the outcomes the retailer receives from the
relationship.
Capability Developmente
Through working with the retailer, to what extent has
your company improved capabilities in
•category management,
•supply chain management,
•consumer understanding,
•pricing management,
•promotions management,
•new product launch, and
•new product development?
aThis is measured on a five-point scale with “nothing planned” and “fully implemented” as the anchors.
bThis is measured on a seven-point scale with “strongly disagree” and “strongly agree” as the anchors.
cThis is measured on a five-point scale with “minimal use” and “standard practice” as the anchors.
dThis is measured on a seven-point scale with “very small extent” and “very large extent” as the anchors.
eThis is measured on a seven-point scale with “significantly below average” and “significantly above average” as the anchors.
fThis is measured on a six-point scale with “extremely low” and “extremely high” as the anchors.
gThe mean and standard deviation for ECR adoption subdimensions are in parentheses.
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